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Abstract 
The present paper investigates the tax returns of French cohabiting couples with children, defined here 
as neither married nor in a civil union. These couples represent an interesting case, because they form 
two separate tax units according to French tax laws and must optimally assign their children to one of 
the parents’ tax units to optimize tax rebates. Using administrative tax data and a microsimulation 
model, we analyze whether cohabiting couples allocate their children to minimize the joint tax burden 
of the family. We find, however, that children are not optimally allocated in 25% of cases. We interpret 
the reasons why couples fail to financially optimize their situation by discussing the usual explanations 
(e.g., transaction costs, “simple rule,” inertia) as well as a more specific reason: the potential non-
cooperative behavior of cohabiting couples, possibly related to the lack of a binding agreement or 
potential asymmetries of information between partners. We also find suggestive evidence regarding 
heuristics (such as the equal split rule for an even number of children), a large degree of inertia (based 
on fiscal status changes over two years), and possible non-cooperation (suboptimal couples tend to 
separate more and marry less in the subsequent period). 
 
Keywords: efficiency, non-cooperative model, income taxation, learning, tax returns. 
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1 Introduction 
A huge body of literature examines the reasons why individuals fail to financially optimize with respect 
to benefit take-up and tax filing (Chetty, 2015; Leicester et al., 2012). The reasons include complexity, 
cognitive bias (heuristics, inattention, inertia), and disutility associated with compliance and hassle 
costs (among others, see recent evidence in Benzarti, 2015; Bhargava and Manoli, 2015; Feldman et 
al., 2016; Jones, 2012; LaLumia et al., 2015). People often address the issue of tax complexity by 
responding to the most salient or obvious aspects of the decision problem (Abeler and Jäger, 2015; 
Chetty et al., 2009). While the literature focuses on individual decisions and their potential biases, 
suboptimal decisions may also be due to coordination failures or a lack of cooperation in households. 
Another strand of the economic literature uses household efficiency as the core axiom when modeling 
the collective behavior of couples for welfare and policy analyses (Chiappori, 1988). Efficiency is usually 
explained by an implicit cooperation process or by infinitely repeated interactions within non-
cooperative couples that eventually lead to efficiency (cf. Donni and Chiappori, 2011 for a survey and 
Campaña, Gimenez-Nadal and Molina, 2018 for a modern account on efficiency tests). 
In the present paper, we focus on household decisions regarding tax filing with the aim to detect 
potential inefficiencies in couples. We concentrate on French cohabiting couples with children, which 
are defined here as neither married nor in a civil union.1 Cohabiting couples represent an interesting 
case, because they face a coordination problem regarding tax filing in France. Unlike married or civil 
union couples that form a single tax unit, cohabiting couples must file separate tax returns and assign 
each of their children to one of the two tax units in order to benefit from child-related tax rebates. 
Each child can be allocated to only one of the parents who must select an allocation on an annual basis 
that is often non-neutral for tax payments. There is usually a subset of allocations that minimize the 
overall tax liability of the household. In this annually repeated process, couples can make side 
payments so that the partner not benefiting from the child tax rebates is compensated by the other. 
A failure to compensate the other partner or choose the allocation that minimizes tax liability is direct 
evidence of inefficiency and may indicate the limited commitment of couples (Chiappori and 
Mazzocco, 2017). 
To assess whether cohabiting couples file their tax returns optimally, we propose a simulation strategy 
based on administrative tax data on household income levels (taken from various sources) and 
characteristics (relevant for tax calculation) as well as their actual tax liability. Using a microsimulation 
model that reproduces the official tax rules, we calculate the optimal tax liability for each household 
                                                          
1 Note that civil unions and marriages are treated in the same way in our description, as they both give right to 
the same tax rebates in France.  
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as the minimum liability after iteratively assigning children to one or the other parent. 2 By comparing 
this optimal value to the actual tax liability, we can identify the inefficient couples. We find that around 
25-30% of French cohabiting couples do not minimize tax payments, with a non-negligible fraction 
making rather large optimization errors. We provide further suggestive evidence in line with the 
standard interpretations of inefficiency (heuristics, inattention, inertia) as well as the potential non-
cooperation in couples. First, we find patterns pointing to the use of “simple rules” such as attributing 
all children to the main earner or making an equal split in the case of an even number of children. 
Second, the absence of changes between two years is consistent with inertia, as it shows limited signs 
of learning in the household; this trend appears in the same proportions for both efficient and 
inefficient couples. Finally, substantial inefficiencies in the first year are associated with higher chances 
of separation in the following year as well as fewer transitions to marriage or civil union. This suggests 
that non-cooperation is one of the key mechanisms behind inefficiency.  
Two studies conducted in other countries are particularly similar to ours in this respect. Stowhase 
(2011) tests the inefficiency of couples’ choice of tax classes for wage income in Germany, observing 
that 20% of couples do not minimize their tax payments. However, the key difference with our setting 
is that inefficiency is temporary in this German case, while the fiscal loss is definitive in France. Jones 
and O’Hara (2016) examine US households with children and at least two related tax filers to determine 
whether the household minimizes income tax liability by optimally assigning dependents among filers. 
They observe that optimal assignment increases with the payoff for doing so, which is especially the 
case among filers eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). 
Our study contributes to several fields of the economic literature. First, it adds to the empirical 
literature on tax filers who “leave money on the table,” i.e., who fail to financially optimize their 
situation in all kinds of categories. However, the failure to claim children in an optimal manner may 
not only be motivated by the usual drivers of inefficiency (hassle costs, limited rationality) but may 
also reflect an element of non-cooperation in couples. Second, most of the collective model literature 
focuses on strategies to derive testable conditions based on the assumption of efficiency in couples. 
However, these tests often depend on auxiliary assumptions and are unsuited to detect inefficiency.3 
                                                          
2 This paper uses confidential administrative data, available upon request from the French Secure Data Hub 
(https://www.casd.eu/). Our results were certified by the Certification Agency for Scientific Code and Data 
(www.cascad.tech). The replicability certificate and the execution report are available at 
https://www.cascad.tech/certification/62-a-direct-measure-of-inefficiency-within-couples-tax-optimization-in-
french-cohabiting-couples/.  
3 Early tests involve cross-derivatives of male and female Marshallian demand functions or proportionality 
conditions using distribution factors (Bourguignon et al., 2009), which necessarily depend on auxiliary 
assumptions that include functional forms or separability assumptions (e.g., egoistic preferences). Part of these 
limitations are overcome by the nonparametric approach to test collective rationality (Cherchye et al., 2007). 
However, measurement errors may not be systematically taken into account. Furthermore, recent studies 
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Against this background, we provide an original measurement of inefficient behavior that is specific to 
tax filing.  
Finally, the external validity of our analysis is not necessarily limited, because we focus on cohabiting 
couples with children. Nowadays, this group is a very common type of household in France, where the 
majority of births occur outside of marriage. Even if many couples tend to marry after the birth of their 
first child, a relatively large fraction of cohabiting parents remain in free or civil unions.4 
2 Empirical approach 
2.1 Data  
We use an administrative dataset, namely the Echantillon Démographique Permanent (EDP), which 
combines different civil state registers (birth, death, and marriage registers as well as electoral 
registers), tax returns, pay slips, and census information. We focus primarily on the year 2013 for our 
main results, while additional results draw on 2014. The EDP is designed as a random sample of the 
population based on birthdate, including 2.7 million individuals for 2013. Ideally, we wanted to follow 
couples over several years to verify the extent to which inefficient behavior persists over time. 
However, we had at our disposal only two years (2013-2104) of data with detailed tax returns for which 
tax simulations could be performed. Social security numbers are used in the EDP to link individuals 
over time so that the two-year sample forms a panel.  
The first step of our work relates to data preparation and selection using the different datasets 
matched in the EDP. Cohabiting couples with children are identified as follows (see also Costemalle, 
2017). A household is defined as individuals living in the same dwelling. We select households 
comprising a woman and a man who are neither married nor in a civil union and who live with their 
biological children. Because of the complex tax rules in the case of dependent children over the age of 
18 years, we exclude households with older children. To verify that the adults form a cohabiting couple, 
we use civil registers to retrieve the birthdates of each child’s parents, which are then matched with 
the birthdates of the adults living in this household. In this way, we directly eliminate stepfamilies and 
                                                          
question the power of these tests against inefficient alternatives. Most testable conditions are necessary (but 
not sufficient) for efficiency, which means that other decision-making processes such as non-cooperative 
behavior leading to inefficient outcomes cannot be detected by these tests (Naidoo, 2015). On the ability to 
perform meaningful tests, see also Dauphin et al. (2017). 
4 According to the French Statistical Institute (INSEE, 2011), French families (including 13.7 million children under 
18 years) are comprised of 50% of married or civil union couples, 20% of cohabiting couples (our sample), 20% 
of single-parent families, and 9% of blended families (married and non-married couples with children from past 
relationships). Out-of-wedlock births accounted for 11% of all the births in 1980, 20% in 1990, 43% in 2000, 54% 
in 2010, and 59% in 2017 (INSEE, civil registries). By comparison, in the US, they represented around 42% of all 
births in the recent years (National Center for Health Statistics).  
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same-sex couples, which are subject to different tax rules because one of the adults is not the biological 
parent. We obtain a baseline sample of 51,190 cohabiting couples with children under 18 years for 
2013 (for a description, see Table A.1 in the Appendix). 
For some of our estimations, we included data on education level taken from the census. In this case, 
the sample is smaller (32,292 couples in 2013), and due to the census sampling design, it is biased 
toward areas of less than 10,000 inhabitants.5 We keep this limitation in mind when using the sample 
for regressions that include education data. In Table A.1, we compare this reduced sample to the 
baseline sample: many sociodemographic variables are significantly different (we report p-values), but 
this is mainly because of the large sample sizes and precise mean difference tests; it rather appears 
that the differences are relatively modest. Another approach, as suggested by Imbens and Rubin 
(2015), is to consider normalized differences, defined as |?̅?1 − ?̅?2|/√
𝑆1
2+𝑆2
2
2
 for the covariates i=1, 2 for 
the mean ?̅?𝑖  and standard deviation 𝑠𝑖. While there is no established convention, based on the 
conservative rule of thumb suggested by Imbens and Rubin, the normalized difference becomes large 
if it exceeds 0.2. The last column of Table A.1 indicates that our results are far below this level. 
2.2 Tax rules and simulations 
Tax rules. The French tax system includes both a withholding flat tax (the so-called CSG/CRDS, 
representing 8% of wage income in 2013) and a progressive income tax. Here, we focus on the latter 
tax, which shifts over time: the income tax for year t is declared and paid in year t+1. Married or civil 
union couples file joint returns for this progressive income tax: they represent a single tax unit (along 
with all their dependent children), and all their income is jointly taxed. The situation differs for 
cohabiting couples who represent two distinct tax units and file their tax returns separately. When 
children are biological descendants of both cohabiting partners, each child must be associated with 
either the man’s or the woman’s tax unit. This allocation of children can change annually, regardless 
of whether the family configuration has evolved.  
The general rule used to account for children is the family quotient (quotient familial). This system is a 
concrete application of the equal sacrifice principle (Young, 1987). Formally, for a tax unit 𝑖, the 
progressive tax schedule 𝑡() is applied to an equivalent income 𝑦𝑖/𝑠(𝑘𝑖), which is the taxable income 
of that unit, 𝑦𝑖, deflated by an equivalence scale. The total tax liability of this unit is then calculated as 
                                                          
5 The French census is collected over a period of five years. It is systematically collected once every five years for 
localities of less than 10,000 inhabitants, while 8% of localities of more than 10,000 inhabitants are randomly 
selected and interviewed each year. We matched our selected households with census data from 2010 to 2014, 
which provides education information for 100% of areas with less than 10,000 inhabitants and for 1-0.92⁵ (≈34%) 
of the population living in larger cities. 
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𝑇𝑖 = 𝑠(𝑘𝑖) ∙ 𝑡(
𝑦𝑖
𝑠(𝑘𝑖)
). The equivalence scale 𝑠(𝑘𝑖) depends on the number of dependent children 
attached to this unit, 𝑘𝑖. This scale includes a number of adult-equivalents, or “fiscal shares,” calculated 
as 1 for the cohabiting adult (or 2 for married or civil union partners) plus 0.5 for the first and second 
child attached to the unit, and 1 for each additional child. Hence, for a cohabiting partner 𝑖, the explicit 
scale is 𝑠(0) = 1, 𝑠(1) = 1.5, 𝑠(𝑘𝑖) = 𝑘𝑖  for 𝑘𝑖 ≥ 2.  
As the progressive tax schedule is applied to the equivalent income and not to the taxable income, the 
family ratio scheme tends to lower the impact of progressive income taxation and disproportionally 
benefit wealthy taxpayers with many children. To limit this effect, the maximum relief that a taxpayer 
can obtain in 2013 through the application of this system is fixed at 𝑝 = 2,000 EUR per half “fiscal 
share” beyond the first share, which amounts to 𝑝 ∙ 2(𝑠(𝑘𝑖) − 1). Cohabiting couples thus make two 
tax payments, 𝑇𝑓 and 𝑇𝑚 (tax paid by the woman and man, respectively), so that the total household 
tax liability is 𝑇 = 𝑇𝑓 + 𝑇𝑚. In Table A.2, we illustrate the family ratio scheme and maximum relief rule 
for the tax system in 2013. Suppose that the taxable income of taxpayers 1 and 2 are 20,000 and 
80,000 €, respectively, with a number of dependent children varying from 0 to 4. As can be seen, the 
tax liability decreases significantly with the number of dependent children, although the tax relief 
mechanism limits this decrease for high taxable incomes.  
Simulations. We use the tax simulator OPENFISCA, a microsimulation model used by various public 
administrations in France. It provides very accurate calculations of the tax and benefit instruments 
based on household information in the administrative data system. In particular, it can be used to 
calculate the amount of income tax paid by each household based on household income levels and 
demographic characteristics. These data taken from the EDP are perfectly reliable given the 
administrative nature of the data source.6 Information on the number 𝑘𝑓 (𝑘𝑚) of children attached to 
the father’s (mother’s) tax unit is available in the tax registers.  
We use the tax simulator to calculate counterfactual scenarios. For each cohabiting couple with 
children, we simulate the household tax liability 𝑇 for the different possible allocations (𝑘𝑓,𝑘𝑚) of 𝑘 =
𝑘𝑓 + 𝑘𝑚 children for parents 𝑖 = 𝑓, 𝑚 with a total of 𝑘 + 1 possible allocations: for instance, in a family 
with two children, both children can be allocated to either the mother's or the father’s tax return, or 
there can be an equal split. Based on counterfactual simulations, we can identify the subset of optimal 
child allocations, i.e., the allocations leading to a minimization of the tax liability.  
                                                          
6 The EDP contains detailed information on individual incomes according to seven categories, including labor 
income and various types of capital income, which can be used for the application of more specific tax rules that 
are not detailed here.  
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We can also compute the maximal loss from non-optimization, calculated as the difference in tax 
liability between the worst and optimal allocation(s). Losses are potentially very high. The maximum 
loss, or the average difference between the optimal and worst allocations, represents 2.1% of taxable 
income (annual average of 750 €) or 35% of the average tax liability. In Figure 1, the light gray bars 
show the distribution of maximal losses expressed as a percentage of pre-tax household income. For 
the majority of cohabiting couples, the allocation choice of children is far from neutral. Indeed, half of 
households could experience a potential loss of up to 1.7% of annual income (corresponding to 610 € 
on average), while around 70% could lose more than 1% (corresponding to around 350 € on average). 
Based on fiscal data, we are able to observe the actual choices made by cohabiting partners. For each 
household, we can determine whether or not it optimizes the attribution of children to minimize the 
tax liability. We can also compute actual losses, i.e., the gap in tax payments between the actual and 
optimal allocation. The distribution of these losses is shown in dark bars in Figure 1 and discussed 
hereafter. 
 
Figure 1: Actual and maximum fiscal loss due to non-optimization 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EDP data. Sample of cohabiting parents of biological children under 18 years. The 
selection excludes 11.3% of couples who cannot optimize (the tax liability is the same regardless of the allocation of children 
to one or the other parent, being zero in 8.9% of cases and strictly positive in the remaining 2.4%). 
In the Appendix, Table A.3 provides a demographic breakdown (i.e., by number of children k). For each 
group, it shows how the number of optimal allocations is distributed between polar cases (i.e., from 
“only one allocation is optimal” to “all k+1 allocations are optimal”). Some results are derived for the 
subgroup of couples who have a margin of optimization. This group of potential optimizers (PO) 
excludes 11.3% of households located on the diagonal for whom all allocations are optimal: the tax 
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liability is the same regardless of the allocation of children, being zero in 8.9% of cases and strictly 
positive in the remaining 2.4%. Results that focus on PO induce a slight bias against large families: as 
seen in Table A.3, the proportion of households not needing to optimize increases with families of 
three or more children: 14.3% for three children, 24.7% for four, and 34.1% for five and more. This 
pattern is simply explained by the fact that when a partner is not liable for tax, it is not necessary to 
allocate more children to him/her.  
We also consider a sub-subgroup of households with only one optimal allocation among all possible 
allocations, corresponding to the first column of Table A.3. This situation is very frequent for 
households with up to three children. Arguably, this selection of potential optimizers with a unique 
optimum (POU) will be biased toward small and average-sized families (k<4), which is not problematic 
given that large families represent a minority (group sizes are reported in the last column). 
3. Results 
3.1 Main results 
Inefficiency rates. The main results are provided in Table 1. We consider (1) the entire selection of 
cohabiting couples with children under 18 years; (2) the PO subgroup (88.7% of the initial sample); and 
(3) the POU sub-subgroup (83% of the initial sample). For each of these samples, we report the 
distribution of cohabiting couples by family size (column 1), the number of non-optimizers (column 2), 
and their proportion (column 3). A non-negligible rate of inefficiency is observed: overall, 24.8% of 
cohabiting households are non-optimizers, with this figure increasing to 28% for PO and 29.1% for 
POU. The average loss among non-optimizers corresponds to 0.9% of pre-tax income (320 € annually) 
or 14.9% of the average tax liability, which is quite a substantial amount.  
Since these figures may conceal a slight bias against large families, we discuss the inefficiency rate by 
family type. For families with one or two children, the proportion of non-optimizers (i.e., 28.4% of all 
couples with two children) increases when focusing on PO (31.5%) and POU (34%). The rate of non-
optimization for POU rises steeply in larger families, but this is less relevant given the considerable 
reduction in the sample size. An interesting pattern emerges for the baseline selection as well as the 
PO and POU subgroups, since inefficiency rates are higher for families with an even number of children 
(i.e., two and four). A possible explanation may be the use of simple allocation rules such as the “equal 
split” rule, discussed in our interpretations below. 
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Table 1: Rate of non-optimization (and large non-optimization) by demographic group 
Family type 
No. of 
households 
No. of non-
optimizers 
Proportion of 
non-optimizers 
No. of 
households 
with losses 
>1% of income 
Proportion of 
households 
with losses 
>1% of income  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All households         
1 child 27,316 6,147 0.225 1,534 0.056 
2 children 20,411 5,787 0.284 2,280 0.112 
3 children 2,399 454 0.189 222 0.093 
4 children 909 296 0.326 175 0.193 
5 children+ 41 7 0.171 3 0.073 
Total 51,190 12,703 0.248 4,221 0.082 
            
Potential optimizers (couples who can optimize)    
1 child 24,211 6,147 0.254 1,534 0.063 
2 children 18,358 5,787 0.315 2,280 0.124 
3 children 2,055 454 0.221 222 0.108 
4 children 684 296 0.433 175 0.256 
5 children+ 27 7 0.259 3 0.111 
Total 45,411 12,703 0.280 4,221 0.093 
            
Potential optimizers with a unique optimal allocation     
1 child 24,211 6,147 0.254 1,534 0.063 
2 children 16,527 5,617 0.340 2,184 0.132 
3 children 1,457 406 0.279 197 0.135 
4 children 271 195 0.720 133 0.491 
5 children+ 6 4 0.667 2 0.333 
Total 42,480 12,375 0.291 4,054 0.095 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EDP data for 2013. Sample of cohabiting biological parents of children 
under 18 years. The subsample of potential optimizers excludes those for whom all allocations are optimal. 
Within this group, we consider a sub-subsample of potential optimizers with one optimal allocation among 
all possible allocations. 
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These results can be mitigated when examining large income losses. Table 1 reports the number 
(column 4) and proportion (column 5) of households who make substantial optimization errors with 
large inefficiencies, defined as income losses greater than 1%. This proportion is around one-third of 
all inefficiencies (i.e., 8.2% of cohabiting couples), which increases when focusing on PO (9.3%) and 
POU subgroups (9.5%). However, the same pattern emerges as above: inefficiency rates are larger for 
families with two or four children.  
The proportion of actual losses, represented by dark bars in Figure 1, can be compared to the 
distribution of maximal losses. We observe a high number of errors at lower levels between 0.1% and 
0.5% of total income, which decreases regularly from 0.6% to 5% of income. For 70% of the PO 
subgroup, their worst allocation exceeds 1% of income. This allocation is nevertheless chosen by 13% 
of PO (9.3% of the baseline sample). 
3.2 Interpretations and potential mechanisms 
We discuss the reasons underlying potential tax return inefficiencies. Choosing the wrong child 
allocation – i.e., not minimizing tax liability – is clearly suboptimal and may result from transaction 
costs (time required to learn about the optimal allocation), cognitive biases (tax complexity leading to 
heuristics, confusion, and inertia), or commitment issues in couples. We examine each of these 
explanatory mechanisms below. While they cannot be tested, we provide informal checks in the 
analysis by drawing from the intuitions outlined below. 
Informational costs. The first possible explanation relates to whether a couple understands the tax 
rules and then faces transaction costs to optimize. This aspect draws on a large body of literature on 
the lack of information about tax policies (e.g., Bhargava and Manoli, 2015), the potentially high 
burden imposed by tax compliance (Pitt and Slemrod, 1989; Slemrod, 1989), and the associated hassle 
costs (Benzarti, 2015).7 In our case, the family quotient system is a very well-known mechanism in 
France that has existed for decades. It is highly popular with French households on account of the large 
tax advantage that it provides to families with children, which was initially popularized as a 
contributing factor to the relatively high fertility rate in France compared to neighboring countries 
(Landais, 2003). In their tax declaration, residents must explicitly state their number of dependent 
children, and in the case of cohabiting partners, they are reminded that each child can only be allocated 
once (i.e., to one of the two tax units).8 The question thus arises as to whether families can easily 
                                                          
7 Several studies analyze non-optimizing behavior, which is explained by procrastination or the nuisance of 
keeping receipts in the case of underreporting charitable donations, for example (Fack and Landais, 2016). Our 
context is a slightly different, since couples are required to assign their children when filing their tax returns. 
8 Failing to do so is considered to be tax fraud, and an official letter would prompt the couple to correct their 
declaration and jointly inform the authorities regarding the beneficiary of the child allocation. 
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identify the optimal situation. Considering the case of couples with dependent children in 2013, this 
population is young enough to be internet users familiar with online administrative information such 
as the French tax authority website (www.impots.gouv.fr). In 2013, this website was visited 103.1 
million times, most often for the tax simulator with 27.7 million simulations being performed. 
Taxpayers can thus simulate their tax liability by providing the same information as found on tax 
returns (including the child allocation) and applying the same tax rules. However, it may be a burden 
for cohabiting couples with many children to simulate all the possible k+1 allocations – and, indeed, 
greater inefficiency is expected in this case. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that these transaction 
costs can explain the suboptimal decisions in certain households, especially if the gains from searching 
the optimal situation are perceived to be minimal compared to the opportunity cost (of time). In the 
following section, we test whether inefficiency is correlated with family size or proxies for cognitive 
skills (such as higher education). 
Cognitive biases, heuristics, and inertia. Sources of error due to cognitive biases are more likely 
because of specific heuristics applied in the case of tax filing. It is possible that people do not take an 
all-inclusive view of their finances (Thaler, 1999), and as a result, the biases of mental accounting and 
“focusing illusion” may explain apparently irrational behavior (Feldman, 2010). People may make 
decisions regarding complex matters like tax by responding to the most salient or obvious aspect of a 
choice set or decision problem (Chetty et al., 2009; McCaffery and Baron, 2004a; Miller and Mumford, 
2015). There is a burgeoning literature on “psychological frictions” associated with the complexity of 
policy rules and the resulting confusion for individuals (Bhargava and Manoli, 2015; LaLumia et al., 
2015; Liebman and Zeckhauser, 2004; Rees-Jones and Taubinsky, 2019), especially the 
misinterpretation of what affects tax liability (Feldman et al., 2016). Although some taxpayers seek 
information after exogenous shocks to tax salience (Hoopes et al., 2015), they may not adjust their tax 
information in a timely manner, with the literature pointing to incomplete adjustments or inertia (e.g. 
Jones, 2012). Considerations of fairness may also be incompatible with efficiency when considering tax 
design (McCaffery & Baron, 2004b). In our situation, the idea that both partners should benefit from 
the child tax relief may prevail – according to the couple’s own heuristics – over a precise calculation 
of the optimal allocation. For instance, a sense of fairness may be associated with an “equal split” for 
those with two or four children, a bias that we will investigate in the next section.  
Non-cooperation in couples. This particular explanation concerns more than individual cognitive 
biases, as it involves a coordination problem in couples, which has rarely been studied in the tax design 
literature. It may be the case that couples do not redistribute resources efficiently, so that we 
encounter a problem of dynamic non-cooperative behavior (Chiappori and Mazzocco, 2017). This type 
of explanation is easily described: an efficient decision would involve the optimal allocation of children 
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to tax units coupled with a side payment made from the partner benefiting the most from child tax 
relief to the other partner. However, this may not occur because of heuristics and symbolic reasons, 
as emphasized above, or because of the absence of a binding agreement between partners regarding 
the possibility of making these compensating transfers.  
Consider the example summarized in Table 2. Assume partner m earns more than partner f (200 and 
150 in our example, which reflects the average gender income gap in France). He tries to convince her 
to attach all the children to his tax unit by promising to share some of the optimization gains. For 
instance, assume that f’s (m’s) pre-tax income is 150 (200), and her (his) tax liability is 15 (40) due to 
progressivity. She obtains a smaller reduction (10 vs 14) if children are attached to her tax unit. In the 
former case, she gives nothing to her partner as she earns less. In the latter case, he transfers half of 
his gains to her. 
 
Table 2: An example of the allocations of children for tax purposes  
Outcomes for (f,m) Initial situation 
(no children) 
Choice 1: all children 
allocated to mother 
Choice 2: all children 
allocated to father 
Gross income 150, 200 150, 200 150, 200 
Tax liability 15, 40 5, 40 15, 26 
Net income 135, 160 145, 160 135, 174 
Net, after transfer 135, 160 145, 160 142, 167 
Total net household 
income  
295 305 309 
 
Choice 2 is optimal in this simple case (children attached to the father). The mother may accept this – 
even though she is disadvantaged compared to choice 1 – if she considers that both partners will 
benefit (+8 each) compared to their situation before the birth of children (possibly taken as a reference 
point). Conversely, she may ex-ante refuse choice 2, as she anticipates an insufficient redistribution 
(he may promise more than half of the gain, but the agreement is non-binding). She could then argue 
that choice 1 is neutral for him compared to before the birth of children, and he may accept this, 
especially if he does not share his own resources with her.9  
                                                          
9 This type of inefficiency may emerge even more frequently in the case of asymmetrical information, which 
increases the commitment issue. Efficiency in collective models is based on the assumption of perfect 
information, although recent evidence shows that it is limited (Baland and Ziparo, 2017). For instance, the father 
may prefer choice 1 (she gains 10) rather than searching for an optimum, because these calculations would reveal 
the large imbalance in net incomes and possibly lead to redistributive pressure. Another reason is that even in a 
situation with infinitely repeated interactions, the folk theorem shows that almost every allocation situated 
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This example may suitably characterize the situation immediately after the arrival of the first child. 
Renegotiation can take place in the following year at the next annual tax declaration.10 Whether 
inefficiency persists can be verified across two years in our study. It may endure because of inertia in 
household decisions. While the literature indicates that inefficiency is especially obvious in one-off 
decisions (for instance, location choices, as exemplified in Lundberg and Pollack, 2013), enduring 
inefficiency for repetitious decisions such as tax filing seems to more strongly favor non-cooperation.11 
Strong disagreements may result in separation or an absence of further commitment (i.e., marriage), 
which we will explore below. 
Finally, several studies reject the efficiency of household decisions for the allocation of productive 
inputs, notably in the context of developing countries (Duflo and Udry, 2004; Ziparo, 2016). We can 
make an analogy that the process of allocating children to the man or woman is a particular type of 
production decision, affecting the resources controlled by each partner and requiring some degree of 
cooperation if the couple wants to maximize total resources. Even if the household is efficient in terms 
of consumption decisions, this productive step may fail to provide overall efficiency.12 In the next 
section, we discuss the rate of rejection of this “productive efficiency.” 
Potentially confounding policies. As noted by Jones and O’Hara (2016), much of the behavior 
surrounding the assignment of dependent children may stem from the confusing definitions of a 
qualifying child in the tax code. In particular, different definitions of taxes, tax credits, and social 
benefits create complexity that may lead to noncompliance stemming from fraud or error (Holtzblatt 
and McCubbin, 2003; McCubbin, 2000). In the present case, we examined whether the child allocation 
has implications on other elements of the tax-benefit system, but this is not the case. Regarding family 
and social benefits, some welfare payments depend on whether a household is taxable or not. 
However, cohabiting partners with children are considered to be married couples in this respect. Thus, 
their allocation of dependent children for income tax purposes has no incidence on the amount of 
                                                          
between a non-cooperative Nash outcome and the Pareto efficient outcome could be stable. In other words, 
(infinitely) repeated interactions do not necessarily lead to efficient behavior (Baland and Ziparo, 2017).  
10 In the first year, a sequential game may also take place in which one partner is taken by surprise, i.e., m fills in 
his tax form first, leaving f facing this choice (see the experimental evidence on “who holds the mouse” in de 
Palma et al., 2011). Regardless of the dynamic decision-making process, a suboptimal allocation may be chosen 
to reduce the tax paid by one spouse without fully compensating the other. 
11 Tax payments are made in three installments in February, May, and September for 40% of French taxpayers or 
monthly for 60% of them. Early payments are calculated based on the previous tax year. The tax declaration 
(including the child allocation) is made in May/June, leading to a subsequent adjustment in payments (i.e., in the 
September installment or in the monthly installments following the tax declaration). 
12 Baland and Ziparo (2017) offer a comprehensive review of the limitation of the efficiency assumption in 
development economics, but many of their arguments also apply to rich countries, especially in relation to the 
role of time and uncertainty, the limited commitment problem in couples, and the possibility of asymmetric 
information between spouses. 
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possible social benefits.13 It is important to stress that in cases of separation, the right to decide on the 
child’s place of residence is based on the “best interests of the child,” with judges favoring shared 
custody. The previous allocation of children in their parents’ tax returns does not enter into 
consideration. For social benefits, children are allocated to the primary carer according to the law, 
which is independent of previous tax choices.  
3.3. Further characterization of inefficient households 
Patterns of inefficiency. Beyond the mean rates of inefficiency, we suggest a more detailed analysis in 
Table 3 by focusing on families with one to four children, since larger families are much less common. 
In the table, panel (a) shows the distribution of actual allocations by family size and type of allocation 
(“all children allocated to the man,” “equal split,” etc.). Panel (b) shows the distribution in the case of 
random allocations. Chi-squared tests comparing panels (a) and (b) indicate that effective allocations 
deviate significantly from random allocations (all p-values are 0 for all family sizes). For instance, in 
families with one child, 59% claim the child on the father’s tax return, which is significantly different 
from a random allocation of 50% in this case.  
For each allocation type and demographic group, panel (c) reports how frequently this allocation is 
optimal. These frequencies sum up to more than 1, because several allocations can be simultaneously 
optimal. For this reason, panel (c) is not directly comparable with (a) and (b), even though it still gives 
useful indications. For instance, in families with one child, it is more often optimal to associate the 
child with the father’s tax unit (optimal for 70% of couples) as opposed to the mother’s (41%). As seen 
above, actual allocations (panel a) tend to move in this direction (59% for fathers and 41% for mothers) 
compared to random allocations. For families with four children, our conjecture of a bias associated 
with the simple “equal split” rule seems to apply: this equal allocation is chosen in a majority of cases 
(80% in panel a) even though it is less often optimal (61% in panel c). 
Other biases may be at play but are not visible in these results. For instance, claiming all children on 
the tax return of the father, as the main earner, may be another heuristic choice that is effectively 
optimal in most cases. To detect the influence of “simple rules,” we extract information on the 
frequency of typical errors in panel (d). For families with one child, the first row shows that in families 
where it is non-optimal to claim the child with the father, 29% still choose to do so. This type of error 
also emerges in families with two and three children. In couples with four children (and, to a lesser 
extent, with two), very suggestive evidence points to the “equal split” bias. As discussed, this simple 
                                                          
13 We contacted the French Family Benefits Fund (Caisse nationale des allocations familiales), which is 
responsible for the payment of all family, housing, and social benefits in France. For these benefits, the unit of 
entitlement is the household. In this respect, cohabiting couples are treated in the same manner as married or 
civil union couples and form a household with their dependent children.  
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and apparently fair rule may not only be a type of heuristic but also a sign of cooperation failure 
between partners. 
Table 3: Distribution of effective, random, optimal, and suboptimal allocations  
by demographic group and allocation type 
  No. of children: 
  1 2 3 4 
(a) Actual allocation (distribution across allocation types) 
All children allocated to the man 0.59 0.44 0.58 0.14 
All children allocated to the woman 0.41 0.18 0.13 0.03 
Equal split   0.39   0.80 
Most children allocated to the man     0.18 0.03 
Most children allocated to the woman     0.11 0.01 
(b) Random allocation (distribution across allocations types) 
All children allocated to the man 0.50 0.33 0.25 0.20 
All children allocated to the woman 0.50 0.33 0.25 0.20 
Equal split   0.33   0.20 
Most children allocated to the man     0.25 0.20 
Most children allocated to the woman     0.25 0.20 
(c) Optimal allocation (how often each allocation type is optimal) 
All children allocated to the man 0.70 0.59 0.74 0.70 
All children allocated to the woman 0.41 0.22 0.22 0.33 
Equal split   0.48   0.61 
Most children allocated to the man     0.14 0.15 
Most children allocated to the woman     0.16 0.16 
(d) Suboptimal allocation (how often each suboptimal allocation is chosen) 
All children allocated to the man 0.29 0.17 0.12 0.00 
All children allocated to the woman 0.24 0.10 0.06 0.01 
Equal split   0.26   0.78 
Most children allocated to the man     0.13 0.02 
Most children allocated to the woman     0.08 0.01 
No. of observations 27,316 20,411 2,399 909 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EDP data for 2013. Sample of cohabiting biological parents of 
children under 18 years. For each family size, the table shows (a) how actual allocations are distributed 
across allocation types, (b) how random allocations are distributed across allocation types, and (c) how 
optimal allocations are distributed (since several allocations can be optimal, the probabilities vertically 
amount to more than 1 in this panel). Panel (d) is different: for each family size and allocation type, it 
shows the proportion of couples making an error by following this particular allocation type (for 
instance, among couples with one child for whom it is not optimal to assign the child to the father, 29% 
do so and hence commit an error). 
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Profile of non-optimizers. To continue this descriptive analysis of tax sub-optimization, we propose a 
simple regression of the non-optimization status in relation to several basic characteristics (Table 4). 
The first two columns focus on our baseline sample, since very similar results were obtained for the 
PO and POU subgroups (specific comments are provided below in the event of significant differences). 
Consistent with the risk of choosing an “equal split” in the case of an even number of children (as 
documented in Table 3), families with two and four children have a significantly higher probability of 
making an optimization error in general and a large error in particular compared to the omitted group 
(i.e., those with one child). The age of the older child is a good indicator of a couple’s endurance and 
thus its chances of achieving efficiency through cooperation and coordination. It also corresponds to 
the duration for which the cohabiting couple is faced with the optimization issue of child allocation, 
thus indicating the time available to learn about the tax rules or simulate their tax liabilities under 
different allocation scenarios. Controlling for the age of the parents and the number of children, the 
age of the eldest child is negatively and significantly correlated with the probability of overlooking the 
optimal allocation. Perhaps counterintuitively given the previous argument, older couples are more 
likely to be inefficient overall (but not commit large errors). The chances of optimization errors increase 
with the couple’s income, essentially because low-income couples correspond to clearer situations: 
the wife is more frequently out of the labor market in poorer households, while her partner is tax-
liable only if the children are not allocated to him. By contrast, the probability of large errors decreases 
with income, perhaps because wealthy families tend to more systematically optimize their finances.14 
Finally, for cohabiting couples, civil union may be seen as a means of tax optimization, since it allows 
them to benefit from the same tax treatment as married couples without the obligation to marry. In 
this respect, we observe that cohabiting couples who have the most to gain fiscally from civil union are 
also more likely to sub-optimize their child allocation. While this might indicate that inefficient couples 
make suboptimal decisions in more than one domain, it is not certain that civil union is fiscally optimal 
for all couples. Indeed, civil union is a less binding form of contract compared to marriage, but it may 
still entail costs (Leturcq, 2012) at the time of the union (commitment to cohabiting, reciprocal material 
assistance for regular household expenses such as rent, food, and health, and joint liability for debts) 
or in the event of partnership breakdown (if the partners opt for joint ownership). 
  
                                                          
14 This result is stable regardless of the specification (log of income, quadratic form, etc.). A flexible specification 
using dummies for income quintiles tends to confirm the given explanation, since the probability of optimization 
errors is significantly positive for quintiles 2, 3, 4, and 5 (relative to quintile 1) while the probability of “large” 
errors is significantly positive for quintiles 2, 3, and 4 and turns negative at the top of the distribution, which is 
consistent with tax optimization behavior among the wealthy. 
17 
 
Table 4: Profile of non-optimizers 
  
Binary dependent   
Binary dependent (sample with 
education variables) 
  
Non-optimizer 
Non-optimizer 
(loss >1%) 
  Non-optimizer 
Non-optimizer 
(loss >1%) 
Two children (a) 0.0580*** 0.0530***   0.0519*** 0.0526*** 
  (0.0043) (0.0026)   (0.0055) (0.0032) 
Three children (a) -0.0249*** 0.0302***   -0.0324*** 0.0258*** 
  (0.0082) (0.0058)   (0.0101) (0.0069) 
Four or more children (a) 0.0797*** 0.0957***   0.0969*** 0.1045*** 
  (0.0118) (0.0099)   (0.0155) (0.0136) 
Age of eldest child -0.0048*** -0.0033***   -0.0050*** -0.0040*** 
  (0.0008) (0.0004)   (0.0010) (0.0006) 
Mean age of parents / 100 0.3277*** 0.0048   0.2592*** 0.0284 
  (0.0469) (0.0246)   (0.0522) (0.0311) 
Annual income / 10,000 0.0085** -0.0115***   0.0335*** -0.0106*** 
  (0.00357) (0.00087)   (0.00387) (0.00114) 
Tax gain from marriage/civil 
union 
0.2137*** 0.2908***   0.1983*** 0.2946*** 
  (0.0049) (0.0040)   (0.0062) (0.0051) 
At least a Master’s degree (both parents)      -0.1069*** -0.0453*** 
        (0.0122) (0.0065) 
At least a Master’s degree (father) 
  
    -0.1010*** -0.0502*** 
        (0.0124) (0.0071) 
At least a Master’s degree (mother)     0.0131 -0.0010 
        (0.0093) (0.0050) 
Constant 0.0495*** 0.0349***   0.0215 0.0321*** 
  (0.0111) (0.0067)   (0.0160) (0.0089) 
No. of observations 51,190 51,190   32,292 32,292 
Source: Probit estimations based on EDP data for 2013 and authors’ calculation of tax optimization. Sample of 
cohabiting biological parents of children under 18 years. A linear probability model with standard errors that 
are robust to heteroscedasticity of unknown form gives almost identical results (and a R2 of 0.06 in columns 1 
and 3, and 0.22 in columns 2 and 4). Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
(a) Reference: one child. 
 
The last two columns of Table 4 show the regression results conducted on a smaller sample with 
education variables. For the common set of covariates, these results are highly comparable to those 
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on the entire sample despite the aforementioned bias toward small population areas in the French 
census. To verify cognitive skills, we added education variables to the analysis. In families where both 
parents or only the father hold a Master’s degree or PhD, optimization errors are less frequent, 
perhaps due to the ability of more educated couples to understand the tax rules and optimize them.15  
A detailed breakdown of the causes of inefficiency is beyond the scope of the present paper and would 
probably require experimental evidence. Nonetheless, we can provide suggestive evidence about the 
potential cognitive biases and non-cooperative behavior. 
 
3.4 Transition patterns, learning, and inertia  
We present the transition patterns in terms of tax optimization behavior. We characterize transitions 
between 2013 and 2014 using panel information for couples who remain cohabiting and continue to 
face the issue of allocating children to two tax units.16 To clarify the analysis, we focus on couples with 
a fixed number of children over the two years and only one optimal allocation in both years (the 
amount of this optimal allocation may vary). This subgroup represents 24,514 households, which is a 
sufficiently large group to make interesting observations.  
The transition patterns are reported in Table 5. We first distinguish optimizers and non-optimizers in 
2013 (first column), which are in comparable proportions to the baseline results for the POU subgroup 
(Table 1), namely 71% and 29%, respectively. The second column splits these groups according to 
whether the (single) optimal allocation evolved between 2013 and 2014. The reasons for a possible 
change include a change in earnings (due to events such as job loss, wage rise, etc.) or tax reforms.17 
Yet only a minority of couples experienced changes that affected the optimal choice.  
We study the optimizing behavior of families in 2014. The proportion of non-optimizers is similar to 
2013 (28.8%). The last two columns of Table 5 show a breakdown according to the different situations 
(all reported frequencies sum up to 1). The largest groups are composed of couples whose unique 
optimal allocation did not change over the two year and who remain optimizers (group C, 59.9%) or 
non-optimizers (group H, 18.3%). Non-optimizers represent 23.4% of groups C+H, indicating that the 
                                                          
15 Alternative estimations that include a dummy for locality size – to account for the sampling bias in this smaller 
sample – give similar results. 
16 In other words, couples who were married or entered a civil union in 2014 are not included. If these new unions 
are regarded as a form of tax optimization and a reflection of cooperative behavior, then the following 
characterization concerns a slightly different group from our initial 2013 sample, i.e., a group that is, by definition, 
less likely to coordinate. 
17 Reforms in the 2013-2014 period include changes to the tax bands (i.e., an increase of 0.8%, which is lower 
than wage inflation and may generate “bracket creep”), a change to the family quotient system and amount of 
possible tax relief (namely, a decrease of 𝑝 from 2,000 to 1,500 € per half-fiscal share beyond the first share), 
and a small change to the tax credit mechanism benefiting couples with low tax liability (décote fiscale). 
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rate of inefficiency is only slightly less than the 2013 rate (29%) for those with stable circumstances 
and unchanged decisions. For group H, it is likely that inertia plays a role in households remaining non-
optimizers in addition to the persistence of cognitive biases and non-cooperative behavior.18  
 
Table 5: Transition patterns for demographically stable couples  
(only one optimal allocation per year) 
 Optimal allocation in 
2014 (compared to 
2013) 
Choice in 2014 
Choice in 2013 Optimizer (71.2%) Non-optimizer (28.8%) 
        
Optimizer Changed A: 494, 2% B: 1,926, 7.9% 
(17,382; 70.9%) (2,420; 14%)     
  Unchanged C: 14,692, 59.9% D: 270, 1.1% 
  (14,962; 86%)     
        
Non-optimizer Changed E: 1,855, 7.6% F: 366, 1.5% 
(7,132; 29.1%) (2,221; 31%)     
  Unchanged G: 413, 1.7% H: 4,498, 18.3% 
  (4,911; 69%)     
Source: Transitions between 2013 and 2014 using EDP data and authors’ calculation of tax 
optimization. Sample of cohabiting biological parents of children under 18 years with stable 
demographics (number of children) who are potential optimizers with only one optimal allocation in 
each year. 
 
The other groups with constant optimal allocations consist of couples who change their child allocation 
in 2014 (groups D and G). Group G is much larger, which may reflect a majority of learners regarding 
tax optimization and/or cooperation/coordination in couples. The other subset of couples who switch 
to optimization (group E) or non-optimization (group B) is much larger and essentially composed of 
“involuntary movers”: 98% of them did not update their child allocation between the two years, while 
the optimal allocation has simply changed. Group E with improved optimization in 2014 may have 
experienced lucky inertia or may have been close to the correct allocation in 2013 but fully optimized 
in 2014. Similarly, group B seems to deteriorate but may have experienced unlucky inertia or switched 
from optimization in 2013 to a slight sub-optimization in 2014.19 
                                                          
18 Staw (1974) and Staw and Ross (1989) use the term “escalating commitment” to describe people’s common 
tendency to not question initial decisions that are nevertheless contradicted by the facts. 
19 Additional calculations show that the average fiscal loss of group E in 2013 (and group B in 2014) was below 
average. Couples who face a new optimum and need to change the child allocation (A and F) are the counterparts 
of the two main groups (C and H), but they cannot benefit from lucky inertia. Group A are optimizers who adjust 
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On the whole, there is little learning and much inertia in households: 81.8% of couples maintain the 
same optimization status over both years (61.9% optimizers, 19.8% non-optimizers). When the optimal 
allocation is stable, persistence in the same status is even higher, being 96.6% (73.9% optimizers and 
22.6% non-optimizers), while in the remaining 3.7%, a majority (60%) seems to learn. When the 
optimal allocation changes, the transition pattern mainly reveals lucky (40%) or unlucky inertia 
(41.5%).  
3.5 Non-cooperation 
Finally, we question whether the lack of cooperation possibly revealed by tax inefficiency is associated 
with specific trends in marital status. As previously mentioned, it is expected that non-cooperative 
couples tend to marry less and separate more frequently. Based on our initial sample of potential 
optimizers in 2013 (45,411 observations), we verify any changes made to their marital status between 
2013 and 2014, i.e., whether the couple stays unmarried, marries, enters into a civil union, or 
separates. Since only large non-optimization losses may reveal non-cooperative behavior, we primarily 
focus on losses above 1% of income. 
We find that the rate of new marriages in 2014 among optimizers in 2013 is 10% higher than among 
non-optimizers, while the rate of separation is 32% lower. To go beyond basic statistics and control for 
household characteristics that could possibly affect these trends, we estimate a multinomial logit with 
the three categories of marital status in 2014 (the omitted category is the status quo). We also control 
for the basic covariates previously used in the profile of non-optimizers. These estimations are 
conducted on the PO subgroup, but sensitivity analyses are discussed below. 
The results reported in Table 6 are striking, even if merely suggestive: being a non-optimizer in 2013 is 
associated with significantly higher chances of separation and significantly lower probabilities of 
marriage or civil union in 2014. We also report marginal effects: the change in marital status probability 
corresponds to 0.6 percentage points in the case of separation, -0.9 percentage points for marriage, 
and -0.6 percentage points for civil union. Other variables are interesting. Couples with more children 
tend to marry more often than those with only one child, but they do not tend to enter into a civil 
union. The duration of relationships, as proxied by the age of the eldest child, is associated with higher 
chances of separation and lower chances of entering into a civil union. Richer couples seem more 
stable, as they tend to separate less and marry or enter into a civil union more often. The potential tax 
gain from marriage or civil union is strongly associated with entering into civil unions and, to a lesser 
                                                          
their choice to the new optimum. By contrast, group F constantly opts for a suboptimal allocation, with 75% 
being subject to unlucky inertia (their choice is suboptimal in both years). 
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extent, into marriage. This is consistent with the fact that a civil union is less costly and easier to 
terminate than a marriage (Leturcq, 2012). 
Sensitivity checks are reported in Table A.4 in the Appendix. We alternatively use the baseline 
selection, the PO subgroup (i.e., baseline estimates from Table 5), and the nested POU: all three 
selections yield similar results. We then focus on the smaller sample containing education variables 
that are controlled. Estimates lead to the same conclusions. The last row shows the regression results 
when varying the non-optimization definition, i.e., non-optimizers lose more than 0.5% of annual 
income. The correlation with changes in marital status is arguably smaller (and becomes insignificant 
in the case of marriage), but this points to the same type of interpretations. 
Table 6: Correlates of marital status change in 2014  
Marginal effects 
Probability of 
separation 
Probability of 
marriage 
Probability of 
civil union 
    
Large non-optimization in 2013 (a) 0.006** -0.009*** -0.006** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Two children (ref: one) -0.002 0.012*** -0.003* 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Three or more children (ref: one) -0.002 0.016*** -0.010** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Age of the eldest child 0.001** 0.000 -0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mean age of parents / 100 -0.040*** -0.170*** -0.080*** 
  (0.013) (0.019) (0.015) 
Annual income / 10,000 -0.003*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Income difference between partners  0.002*** 0.000 -0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tax gain from marriage/civil union (b) 0.003* 0.007*** 0.014*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Source: Multinomial logit estimation (marginal effects reported) of changes in marital status between 
2013 and 2014 based on EDP data and authors’ calculation of tax optimization. Sample of cohabiting 
biological parents of children under 18 years who are potential optimizers in 2013 (i.e., excluding those 
for whom all allocations are optimal). All the covariates refer to the situation in 2013 (non-
optimization, family composition, etc.). No. of observations: 45,411. Standard error in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
(a) Dummy = 1 if large non-optimization in 2013 (i.e., misallocation of children in tax returns leads to 
a loss of more than 1% of household income) 
(b) Dummy = 1 if marriage or entering into a civil union would have lowered the tax liability in 2013. 
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4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we suggest a direct measurement of cohabiting couples’ inefficiency for a repeated 
decision that affects the budget constraint, namely tax optimization via the allocation of children for 
tax rebates. Cohabiting couples with children who do not optimally assign their children to the 
woman’s or the man’s tax unit fail to maximize disposable household income. According to our results, 
this is the case for around 800,000 cohabiting couples (29.1% of cohabiting couples in 2013 and 28.8% 
in 2014). The average loss among non-optimizers corresponds to 15% of the average tax liability, which 
is a sizable amount.  
We find traces of heuristics such as an equal split for an even number of children or claiming all the 
children on the main earner’s tax return. There seems to be little learning and much inertia among 
cohabiting couples, as most stay in the same optimization status from year to year even in the case of 
financial disadvantage. Future research should look at this dynamic over a period of several years in 
order to check whether inefficient couples eventually improve their situation by learning or 
cooperation and are able to achieve efficiency after a few years. The present study is a first attempt, 
as it includes only two years of administrative data, but further research should follow couples over a 
longer time period to identify the precise effects of changes in tax rules or individual circumstances. 
Without experimental data, it is difficult to disentangle the contributions of cognitive bias, heuristics, 
and non-cooperative behavior when examining the allocation of children to their parents’ tax units. 
Nonetheless, our results indicate that inefficient allocations of children between tax units may partly 
be due to non-cooperation within the household. We show that the couples making large optimization 
errors also tend to separate more and marry less, all else being equal. This is suggestive of non-
cooperation as a possible mechanism for tax inefficiency.20 To explore this notion further, new research 
could conduct experiments with real couples or pairs of individuals who could participate in tasks that 
mimic real-world decisions regarding tax filing and a (productive) allocation problem.21  
  
                                                          
20 Previous studies have tended to test uniform behavior, even though heterogeneity prevails in the real world. 
Among the exceptions, a few theoretical contributions, notably Cherchye et al. (2015) and d’Aspremont and Dos 
Santos Ferreira (2018), consider the continuum of types between cooperative and non-cooperative couples. We 
document here the coexistence of efficient and inefficient types. Our results indicate that (collective) models 
positing efficiency are not suitable for a large fraction of the population, while they also (trivially) imply a 
rejection of the unitary model. Indeed, if partners pool their income, they aim to maximize disposable household 
income and optimize the way in which they allocate children for tax declarations. To date, the best evidence 
against the unitary model was the rejection of income pooling following a “wallet-to-purse” transfer induced by 
policy reform (Lundberg et al., 1997). 
21 See recent experimental evidence in Couprie et al. (2016, 2017) and de Palma et al. (2011).  
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Appendix  
 
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics  
  
Baseline 
sample 
Sub-sample 
with 
education 
Difference 
Mean 
difference 
test (p-
value) 
Normalized 
difference 
(abs. value) 
Taxable income 35,406 35,439 -34 0.841 0.00 
  (25,692) (19,234) (156.05)     
Taxable income (father) 20,589 20,652 -63 0.607 0.00 
  (19,456) (12,981) (112.31)     
Taxable income (mother) 14,816 14,787 29 0.742 0.00 
  (13,441) (11,068) (85.57)     
Age (father) 35.0 35.3 -0.3 0.000 0.04 
  (7.0) (6.8) (0.05)     
Age (mother) 32.7 33.0 -0.3 0.000 0.05 
  (6.4) (6.2) (0.04)     
Number of children 1.56 1.58 -0.02 0.000 0.03 
  (0.71) (0.69) (0.00)     
Mean age of children 3.7 4.0 -0.2 0.000 0.07 
  (3.2) (3.2) (0.02)     
Age of the eldest child 4.5 4.8 -0.3 0.000 0.08 
  (3.69) (3.67) (0.03)     
Age of the youngest child 3.0 3.1 -0.2 0.000 0.05 
  (3.06) (3.08) (0.02)     
No. of observations 51,190 32,292       
Sources: EDP data for 2013 and authors’ own calculation. 
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Table A.2: Two examples of the French family quotient scheme 
  Number of dependent children 
  0 1 2 3 4 
Taxpayer 1: Taxable income 20,000 €      
Tax liability without maximum relief 1,450 654 0 0 0 
Tax liability with maximum relief 1,450 654 0 0 0 
Taxpayer 2: Taxable income 80,000 €      
Tax liability without maximum relief 19,336 15,584 12,778 7,168 5,801 
Tax liability with maximum relief 19,336 17,836 16,336 13,336 10,336 
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Table A.3: Distribution of optimal allocations by family size 
Number of 
children 
Number of optimal allocations Group 
size 
Group  
size (%) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  1 0.886 0.114           27,316 0.534 
  2 0.810 0.090 0.101         20,411 0.399 
  3 0.607 0.144 0.106 0.143       2,399 0.047 
  4 0.298 0.175 0.160 0.120 0.248     909 0.018 
  5 0.146 0.098 0.268 0.122 0.024 0.342   41 0.001 
  6 0.076 0.047 0.057 0.170 0.151 0.160 0.340 106 0.002 
Group size 42,470 5,457 2,466 478 242 33 36 51,182 1.000 
Group size (%) 0.830 0.107 0.048 0.009 0.005 0.001 0.001 1.000   
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EDP data for 2013. Sample of cohabiting biological parents of children 
under 18 years. The number of possible allocations is “number of children + 1.” Hence, the subsample of 
“potential optimizers” (those for whom not all allocations are optimal) excludes the diagonal (in blue). We will 
also consider the sub-subsample of “potential optimizers with only one optimal allocation” (i.e., those in the 
first column). 
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Table A.4: Sensitivity analysis for marital status change in 2014 and large non-optimization in 2013 
Sample 
No. of 
observations 
Covariate of interest Controls 
Probability 
of 
Separation 
Probability 
of Marriage 
Probability 
of Civil 
Union 
Baseline selection 50,424 Loss >1% of income Baseline 0.005* -0.010*** -0.008*** 
        (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Potential optimizers  45,191 Loss >1% of income Baseline 0.006** -0,009*** -0,006** 
        (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Potential optimizers 
with a unique optimal 
allocation  
42,269 Loss >1% of income Baseline 0.006** -0.010*** -0.006** 
      (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Potential optimizers, 
subsample with 
education 
29,284 Loss >1% of income 
Baseline + 
education 
0.005* -0.013*** -0.007** 
    (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Potential optimizers  45,191 Loss >0.5% of income Baseline 0.004** -0.003 -0.004* 
        (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Source: Multinomial logit estimation of marital status change between 2013 and 2014 based on EDP data and authors’ 
calculation of tax optimization. Sample of cohabiting biological parents of children under 18 years. We report only 
the coefficient for the non-optimization status in 2013 defined as the misallocation of children to tax units resulting 
in a loss >1% or >0.5% of household income. Baseline controls as in Table 5. Standard error in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
